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Hackel et al., 2017; Rand et al., 2009; Romano, Balliet, & 
Wu, 2017). Thus, the experimental literature has collated 
robust evidence for in-group favouritism. 
Previous studies that investigated in-group favouritism 
with economic games have focused on different groups, 
from minimal groups (Tajfel et al., 1971) to natural groups 
such as those based on religion (Romano, Balliet, & Wu, 
2017), university affiliation (Hackel et al., 2017; Ockenfels 
& Werner, 2014), nationality (Romano, Balliet, Yamagishi, 
et al., 2017), and political ideologies (Rand et al., 2009). 
However, there has not been a systematic investigation 
on the potential role of the types of groups in the in-
group favouring tendency—would the extent to which 
individuals favour in-group members differ depending on 
the nature of groups? In a large-scale meta-analysis on in-
group favouritism, Balliet et al. (2014) found that the extent 
of in-group favouritism did not vary between minimal 
groups and actual groups. Nevertheless, they did not 
examine whether different types of groups (e.g., university 
affiliations vs. political groups) would display different 
levels of the tendency to favour in-group members. 
Bilancini et al. (2020) recently contributed to the 
literature by investigating the effect of different group 
assorting procedures on intergroup discrimination. They 
manipulated the nature of groups (morality-based vs. non-
morality-based groups); half the participants indicated their 
opinion on five moral issues and were told that they were 
grouped with others based on shared moral values (e.g., 
opinion about abortion, euthanasia, death penalty, etc.). On 
the other hand, the other half expressed their opinions on 
non-moral issues (e.g., a preference for dogs or cats) and 
were grouped based on the non-moral opinions. In other 
words, Bilancini et al. (2020) established experimental 
groups which were solely based on the shared moral value 
or non-moral, personal preferences. They compared the 
extent to which individuals discriminated between in-
group members and out-group members in a dictator game 
and found that people displayed more in-group favouritism 
when their group was built on a shared morality. Thus, 
they provided initial evidence that the nature of groups 
would influence in-group favouritism and moral groups 
were more discriminatory than non-moral groups. 
However, it remained unclear whether the increased 
intergroup discrimination among moral groups observed 
in Bilancini et al. (2020) was due to increased favourable 
t reatment for in-group members or/and increased 
derogatory treatment for out-group members. Previous 
studies using the minimal group paradigm demonstrated 
that in-group favouritism in cooperation did not involve 
derogatory behaviour towards out-group members 
(Aaldering et al., 2018), and, thus, it might be reasonably 
assumed that the increased morality-based intergroup 
discrimination observed in Bilancini et al. (2020) would 
be due to the increased prosociality towards in-group 
members rather than increased derogatory behaviour 
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In-group favouritism is ubiquitous and previous 
studies have consistently found that individuals 
cooperate more with in-group members than out-
group members in diverse contexts. Yet, there has 
not been much research on the role of the nature 
of groups in intergroup cooperation. A recent study 
found stronger levels of in-group favouritism amongst 
groups formed on the basis of shared moral values. 
However, it remained unclear whether the increased 
favouritism was caused by a greater tendency to 
act favourably towards the in-group or derogatorily 
towards the out-group. The present study thus 
investigated intergroup cooperation among morality-
based and non-morality-based groups and examined 
the levels of cooperation with an in-group member 
and an out-group member as compared to a person 
whose group membership was unknown. Regardless 
of how groups were formed, in-group favouritism 
was present, while out-group derogation was absent. 
Furthermore, we found that the shared morality 
promoted in-group cooperation indirectly via low 
perceived out-group warmth. Our study provides 
further evidence that in-group favouring behaviour 
does not include derogating out-groups and points to 
the importance of further investigation into the role of 
the shared morality in intergroup cooperation.
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Introduction
In-group favouritism, the tendency to favour in-group 
members over out-group members, has been observed in 
diverse cultures (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2018; Romano, Balliet, 
Yamagishi, et al., 2017). A number of researchers have 
demonstrated that individuals display the tendency in 
various forms of prosocial behaviour, such as cooperation 
(e.g., Aaldering et al., 2018; Ahmed, 2007; Guala et al., 
2013; Romano, Balliet, & Wu, 2017; Romano, Balliet, 
Yamagishi, et al., 2017; Wit & Wilke, 1992; Yamagishi et 
al., 1999) and prosocial giving (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2018; 
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finding documenting the increased in-group favouritism in 
moral groups. To directly examine the source of in-group 
favouritism, we compared cooperation with an in-group 
member, out-group member, and a stranger whose group 
membership was unknown in a prisoners’ dilemma. 
Method
We collected 200 participants (Mage = 34.58, SD = 11.39, 
74 females) via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The study 
followed a 2 (condition: moral group vs. non-moral group) 
x 3 (group; in-group vs. out-group vs. unknown) mixed 
design with the latter being a within-subject factor. A 
priori power analysis revealed that 84 participants would 
be sufficient to detect in-group favouritism (d = 0.32 from 
Balliet et al., 2014) with 90% statistical power, and the 
study was sufficiently powered. In supplementary material, 
we have provided the results of some auxiliary analyses we 
do not report in this article. 
Participants were invited to take part in an online 
survey that consisted of three parts: a minimal group 
induction, prisoners’ dilemmas, and a post-experiment 
questionnaire. As a cover story, participants were informed 
that the study was designed to understand the relationship 
between personality and economic behaviour. After 
giving consent, participants proceeded to the minimal 
group induction and were presented with five questions 
that ostensibly measured either personality or morality. 
For those who were randomly assigned to the moral group 
condition, these questions were related to moral issues. 
By contrast, for those who were in a non-moral condition, 
these were about personal preferences (see Table 1). After 
answering these questions, all participants, regardless 
of the condition, received bogus feedback that, based on 
their responses to the five questions, two groups, your 
group and the other group, were formed. Participants 
were made aware that the group was formed by members 
similar to themselves on either morality or personality. 
Participants then answered six questions measuring their 
levels of social identification with their group (Leonardelli 
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Suppor t ing this, Koopmans and Rebers (2009) 
revealed that in-group favouritism in a public goods game 
did not involve out-group hostility when a majority of 
group members shared the same political orientation, 
which can be interpreted as a moral in-group (Parker & 
Janoff-Bulman, 2013). Yet, it should be noted that in their 
study, participants were informed about several traits (e.g., 
political orientation and religious affiliation) of in-group 
members, and it would be likely that multiple intergroup 
contexts were at stake, failing to directly investigate the 
influence of the nature of group on intergroup cooperation. 
Alternatively, groups based around a shared morality 
may utilize out-group derogation, as previous studies 
have shown that morality-based groups are fundamentally 
distinct from non-morality-based groups (Parker & 
Janoff-Bulman, 2013); Parker and Janoff-Bulman (2013) 
demonstrated that out-group negativity influenced moral, 
but not non-moral intergroup processes, pointing to the 
unique nature of morality-based groups. More relatedly, 
previous studies have found that moral disagreements 
motivate a desire for social and physical distance and 
lower levels of cooperative intention and goodwill (Skitka 
et al., 2005; also see Haidt et al., 2003; Mullen & Skitka, 
2006). Moreover, other research has found an increased 
willingness to discriminate against groups with different 
moral worldviews (Wetherell et al., 2013), and behavioural 
evidence shows increased outgroup derogation towards 
a morally conflicting out-group (Weisel & Böhm, 2015). 
More specifically, using an economic game paradigm, 
Weisel and Böhm (2015) demonstrated that out-group 
derogation was higher for an out-group that arguably held 
different moral values than out-groups which were not 
typically seen as morally conflicting with the in-group. 
Therefore, while some previous studies demonstrated that 
intergroup discrimination in cooperation does not entail 
derogating out-groups, it would be likely that moral groups 
would have a unique tendency to do so.  
The present research, therefore, aimed to investigate 
the source of in-group favouritism among moral and non-
moral groups, replicating and extending the previous 
Table 1. Summary of questions for minimal group inductions.
Question  Available Responses
Non-Moral Minimal Group
Where do you prefer to go during vacation? Sea, Mountain, No opinion
Where do you prefer to watch movies? Movie theater, Home, No opinion 
Where do you prefer to do physical activity? Gym, Outdoor, No opinion
Which social network do you prefer? Instagram, Facebook, No opinion
Which animal do you prefer? Dog, Cat, No opinion
Moral Minimal Group
Abortion Morally acceptable, Morally wrong, No opinion
Doctor assisted suicide Morally acceptable, Morally wrong, No opinion
Death penalty Morally acceptable, Morally wrong, No opinion
Gay or lesbian relations Morally acceptable, Morally wrong, No opinion
Prostitution  Morally acceptable, Morally wrong, No opinion
Note: these items are identical to those used in Bilancini et al. (2020)
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instructed them that their partner knew their group 
membership. 
Fi na l ly,  t hey comple ted the pos t- exper iment 
questionnaire, including in-group warmth and out-
group warmth, using the feeling thermometer measure. 
Participants were asked to rate their feeling towards 
the in- and out-group using a scale ranging from 0° = 
Very cold or unfavourable feeling to 100° = Very warm 
or favourable feeling. We introduced this as Parker and 
Janoff-Bulman (2013) found that intergroup warmth 
perception distinguished between moral and non-moral 
groups: More specifically, they revealed that while the 
importance of the moral in-group (i.e., how important 
group members thought their group was to themselves) 
was equally associated with in- and out-group warmth 
perception, the former was more strongly related to the in-
group importance for non-moral groups. The order of these 
was randomized and counterbalanced. They then provided 
demographic information such as sex, age, and nationality, 
as well as their political position.  
Results
We first carried out one sample t-tests as a manipulation 
check for the minimal group induction. The mean of social 
identification among those in the moral group condition 
was 3.91 (SD = 0.78) and it was significantly higher than 
the scale centre of 3.5, t(101) = 3.08, p = .002, d = 0.38. 
The strength of social identification among those in the 
non-moral condition (M = 3.91, SD = 0.90) was also 
significantly higher than the scale centre, t(97) = 4.55, p < 
.001, d = 0.38. Thus, social identification was sufficiently 
induced by the minimal group manipulation. Notably, the 
strength of social identification did not significantly differ 
between participants in the moral and non-moral group 
conditions, t(198) = 1.50, p = .14, d = 0.21.
We conducted a 2 x 3 (condition x group) mixed 
30
& Brewer, 2001; e.g., Belonging to MY GROUP is an 
important part of my life, α = .75), using a six-point scale 
from 1 = Strongly disagree to 6 = Strongly agree. In 
addition, they answered a question measuring to what 
extent they perceived the out-group to be threatening to 
their in-group with the same 6-point scale. Parker and 
Janoff-Bulman (2013) found that moral out-groups posed 
more threat than non-moral out-groups: Out-group threat 
would be one of the variables that distinguish between 
moral and non-moral groups.  
After the minimal group induction, participants were 
told that they would complete an economic decision 
making scenario (i.e., the prisoners’ dilemma) several 
times in pairs with other participants. In the prisoners’ 
dilemma, two paired individuals were endowed with 300 
cents and asked to decide how much of the money they 
would like to transfer to the other participant, knowing 
that each cent, if any, would be doubled before it was given 
to their partner. They simultaneously made a decision such 
that they did not know how much their partner transferred 
to themselves. We used the amount of transferred money 
as an index of cooperation. Before proceeding to play the 
game, they answered comprehension questions regarding 
the structure of the game. Participants then completed it 
electronically with a member of their group, a member of 
the other group, and a random stranger, in a randomized 
order. They indicated who their partner was (an in-
group member, an out-group member, or a person whose 
group membership was unknown) to make sure they 
correctly understood their partner. However, in actuality, 
par ticipants completed the game with hypothetical 
partners, and they were not matched with others during 
the experiment. As previous studies demonstrated that 
intergroup discrimination would not emerge when group 
membership was not mutually known between the two 
players (Balliet et al., 2014; Guala et al., 2013; Yamagishi 
et al., 1999; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008), we explicitly 
Figure 1. Cooperation by Group and Condition. 
Note: Error bars indicate standard errors.
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ANOVA on cooperation (see Figure 1). The assumption for 
the sphericity was violated for the group and we employed 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom for 
the subsequent results. The main effect of the condition 
was not significant, F(1, 198) = 3.15, p = .08, partial η2 = 
.02. We found a significant effect of the group, F(1.88, 
373.09) = 21.34, p < .001, partial η2 = .10. The interaction 
term was not significant, F(1.88, 373.09) = .26, p = .76, 
partial η2 = .001. Thus, we did not find statistical evidence 
for increased in-group favouritism in the moral group as 
compared to the non-moral group. We further conducted 
post-hoc comparisons using estimated marginal means 
(Tukey adjustment) and found that in-group cooperation 
(M = 195.32, SD = 77.59) was signif icantly higher 
than out-group (M = 169.75 SD = 86.04) and unknown 
cooperation (M = 169.30, SD = 84.64) in the moral group 
condition, ts > 4.38, ps < .001. Similarly, participants 
cooperated with the in-group member (M = 210.93, SD = 
77.77) significantly more than the out-group member (M 
= 191.41, SD =81.96) and the stranger (M = 187.85, SD 
=80.86) in the non-moral condition, ts > 3.27, ps < .01. 
In both conditions, out-group cooperation and unknown 
cooperation were not significantly different, ts < 0.60, ps 
> .99. Therefore, regardless of how the minimal group was 
formed, individuals favoured in-group members and did 
not show out-group derogatory behaviour, as the levels of 
cooperation in the out-group and unknown conditions did 
not significantly differ.
Finally, we sought to exploratorily investigate the 
inf luence of warmth perceptions and out-group threat 
on the in-group favouring tendency. We computed 
correlations among in-group favouritism (cooperation in 
the in-group condition–that in the out-group condition), 
in-group love (cooperation the in-group condition–that in 
the stranger condition), out-group derogation (cooperation 
the stranger condition–that in the out-group condition), 
intergroup warmth, and out-group threat (see Table 2).  
Based on the cor relat ional f indings, using the 
condition (Moral group = 1, Non-moral group = 0) as an 
exogenous variable, we built a partial mediation model 
where the condition had three indirect effects on in-
group favouritism via intergroup warmth perceptions and 
out-group threat. With the bias-corrected bootstrapping 
method, the mediation analysis revealed that the indirect 
path via out-group warmth was significant, suggesting 
that moral groups displayed more in-group favouritism via 
decreased out-group warmth perception, B = 12.73, p = 
.004, 95% CI [3.96, 21.51]. Yet, the indirect effects via in-
group warmth and out-group threat were not significant, 
|B|s < 1.85, p > 55. We conducted the mediation analyses 
predicting in-group love and out-group derogation, instead 
of in-group favouritism. We found a similar pattern for the 
in-group love, but no indirect effects were significant for 
out-group derogation (see supplementary results). 
Discussion
In the present research, we investigated intergroup 
cooperation among moral and non-moral groups, using 
the minimal group paradigm. Specifically, we sought to 
examine whether increased in-group favouritism among 
moral groups, which was observed in Bilancini et al. 
(2020), was due to increased in-group love or out-group 
derogation. We found that participants favoured in-group 
members but did not derogate out-group members. This 
was consistent with prior studies that demonstrated that in-
group favouritism was a product of increased favourable 
treatments for in-group members (Aaldering et al., 2018). 
However, unlike Bilancini et al. (2020), we did not find 
strong evidence for increased in-group favouritism in 
Table 2. Correlations by Condition.
Moral Group Condition
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. In-group Favouritism -
2. In-group Love     .64* -
3. Out-group Derogation     .58*   −.25* -
4. In-group Warmth   .12   .15 −.01 -
5. Out-group Warmth   −.32* −.11   −.28*     .41* -
6. Out-group Threat   .13 −.13     .30*   .10 −.13 -
Non-Moral Group Condition
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. In-group Favouritism -
2. In-group Love     .67* -
3. Out-group Derogation     .42*   −.39* -
4. In-group Warmth     .28*   .19   .11 -
5. Out-group Warmth −.17   −.27*   .12     .57* -
6. Out-group Threat   .06   .18 −.15   .13   .12 -
Note: * p < .05.
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moral groups as compared to non-moral groups; the nature 
of the group only indirectly affected in-group favouritism 
and in-group love via the perception of out-group warmth. 
More specifically, it was revealed that individuals in the 
moral group displayed stronger in-group favouritism and 
love via reduced out-group warmth perception compared 
to those in the non-moral group condition. Overall, our 
findings suggested that out-group derogation was absent 
in both moral and non-moral groups and the increased 
discrimination in the former was rather due to the 
increased in-group love.
Our study extended the previous study (Bilancini et al., 
2020) by revealing the source of in-group favouritism and 
the mediating role of out-group warmth. Our finding that 
out-group warmth perception mediated the relationship 
between the nature of groups and in-group favouritism 
has provided additional evidence for the pivotal role of the 
perception of the out-group in moral groups, consistently 
with Parker and Janoff-Bulman (2013). 
It should be noted, however, that our evidence for 
the causal relationship among the nature of groups, out-
group warmth, and in-group favoritism was obtained by 
the mediation analysis and did not provide a solid basis 
to establish the causality. Therefore, a further empirical 
investigation should be desirable to qualify our claim 
and address how out-group warmth perception uniquely 
contributes to intergroup processes involving moral 
conflicts. 
Notably, while previous studies have shown that out-
group derogation would be higher for moral out-groups 
(Weisel & Böhm, 2015) than non-moral out-groups, we 
did not find such evidence. We have two explanations 
for the discrepancy. First, we operationally defined out-
group derogation such that more derogation indicates less 
cooperation with an out-group member relative to a person 
without group membership. By contrast, Weisel and Böhm 
(2015) employed different economic game paradigms 
(intergroup prisoners’ dilemma maximizing-difference) 
and defined out-group derogation as the preference for the 
monetary investment in a pool which (1) increases payoff 
for in-group members but not for out-group members or 
(2) increases and decreases payoff for in-group and out-
group members, respectively. Thus, our findings focusing 
on the level of cooperation might not necessarily present 
conflicting results against Weisel and Böhm (2015), and the 
mixed results might be due to different operationalizations 
and measurements of out-group derogation. Second, 
Weisel and Böhm (2015) used actual political groups, and 
the observed increased out-group derogation might be 
triggered by social psychological factors in the political 
conflict, such as stereotypes and partisan concern, rather 
than moral conflict per se.       
Lastly, we would like to note that the minimal moral 
group induction might have room for improvement and 
development; we used politically conflated issues (e.g., 
abortion and LGBT relationships) for the moral group 
induction, and par ticipants might t ranspose actual 
intergroup contexts based on the moral issues onto the 
minimal group contexts. In other words, participants 
might treat the minimal in- and out-groups as political in- 
and out-groups. Thus, the minimality of the intergroup 
context might not be warranted enough, and the influence 
of the moral minimal group paradigm would be sensitive 
to morality-related questions used in the induction. On the 
other hand, the moral minimal group paradigm may allow 
us to create a specific moral conflict (e.g., moral conflict 
in care/harm principle) with carefully chosen questions 
and investigate whether the role of shared morality in 
intergroup behaviour would be conditional to the nature of 
the moral conflict. 
Supplementary Material
Study materials including supplementary results, data, 
codebook, and analysis codes are available at https://osf.io/
mvut3/.
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